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Complex systems show the capacity to aggregate information and to display coordinated activity.
In the case of social systems the interaction of different individuals leads to the emergence of norms,
trends in political positions, opinions, cultural traits, and even scientific progress. Examples of
collective behavior can be observed in activities like the Wikipedia and Linux, where individuals
aggregate their knowledge for the benefit of the community, and citizen science, where the potential
of collectives to solve complex problems is exploited. Here, we conducted an online experiment to
investigate the performance of a collective when solving a guessing problem in which each actor is
endowed with partial information and placed as the nodes of an interaction network. We measure the
performance of the collective in terms of the temporal evolution of the accuracy, finding no statistical
difference in the performance for two classes of networks, regular lattices and random networks. We
also determine that a Bayesian description captures the behavior pattern the individuals follow in
aggregating information from neighbors to make decisions. In comparison with other simple decision
models, the strategy followed by the players reveals a suboptimal performance of the collective. Our
contribution provides the basis for the micro-macro connection between individual based descriptions
and collective phenomena.
INTRODUCTION
Decision making nowadays is a topic of growing
interest from the scientific community and the industry.
This is because, it can provide statistical predictions of
animal and human behavior [1–6]. The effects of social
influence and collaboration on the collective outcome
have been addressed from different perspectives, both
theoretical and experimental [7–11]. In complex problem
solving, crowd-sourced collaboration has proved to be
beneficial by shortening substantially the time to find
a solution. Examples of these collaborative initiatives
include problem solving in mathematics [12], software
design [13], and data analysis [14].
In the study of cooperation, network reciprocity is
an important mechanism [15, 16]. Theoretical works
have shown that the role of network connectivity on
cooperation depends on the evaluation of the individuals
payoffs that can have a positive effect [17, 18], however,
cooperation can be diminished when the real connection
cost is taken into account [19]. Experimental work in
the Prisoners dilemma game shows that heterogeneous
networks do not enhance cooperation [20]. However,
a dynamic interaction network can promote cooper-
ation [21, 22]. Other works have also addressed how
individuals learn and how the interaction network
can influence the dissemination of useful information,
individual choices, and the social outcomes [23, 24].
The performance of groups when compared with the
performance of individual experts is reflected in The
Wisdom of Crowds effect [25, 26] which suggests that the
aggregation of independent decisions often outperforms
individual experts. However, social influence can have a
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diminishing effect over this phenomenon [27].
To investigate how network structure affects social in-
formation use, decision making and decision accuracy,
we performed an experiment with neutral items where
individuals have to assemble information from peers ac-
cording to an interaction network. Players have to make
decisions based on incomplete and uncertain information,
which allow us to address the process of aggregation of
information and assess the decision making capacities of
the players.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Ethics Statement
This study was approved by the Ethics Committee of
the University of the Balearic Islands. Online informed
consent was obtained from each participant prior to par-
ticipation in the experiment.
Experimental Design
We developed a social experiment consisting of an on-
line game in which players have to guess a sequence of
colors using information of an incomplete sequence pro-
vided initially to them and from the proposals of their
neighbors. The experiment was structured in sessions
each consisting of a set of N individuals assigned ran-
domly to the nodes of a network as sketched in Fig. 1.
The target color code was composed of a sequence of li
positions (i = 1, ..., 10) colored with color c(i) from the
available set (red, blue, and yellow). We defined xj(li, t)
as the color chosen by player j for the position li at time
t.
ar
X
iv
:1
60
4.
01
79
5v
1 
 [p
hy
sic
s.s
oc
-p
h]
  2
9 M
ar 
20
16
2FIG. 1. Illustration of the network configurations. Fo-
cal player (red node) is connected to k=4 neighbors (blue
nodes) having access to their proposals, and, at the same time,
she shares her proposals with them. The remaining nodes and
network connections are depicted by the green nodes and the
gray links, respectively. Random network is represented on
the left and regular network on the right.
We conducted a series of online sessions on different
dates. The first one took place on May 7th, 2014 at
12:30 GMT+1 (Experiment 1) with 20 participants and
a second experiment was conducted 3 weeks later on May
28th, 2014 at 11:30 GMT+1 (Experiment 2) with 17 par-
ticipants. Both experiments were announced through a
mailing list, and the players’ participation was volun-
tary and anonymous. Prior to the start of the exper-
iment, the participants were required to agree on the
Terms and Conditions and they were invited to answer
a survey providing basic demographic data. The partici-
pants, 74% males and 26% females, reported an average
age of 33.6± 7.3 years.
Each experiment consisted of six consecutive games be-
ing the first game intended to familiarize the participant
with the interface and the purpose of the last game to
evaluate the adaptation process of the players. The first
and the last games were played against automata. In the
remaining games, the participants interacted with other
participants. Players were not informed whether they
played with automata or with human players. An item-
ized list of instructions was provided at the beginning
of each experiment. During the game, the participants
also had access to a summary of the main instructions
available on the screen (see Supporting Information for a
description of the instructions provided). No economical
incentive was offered to the participants.
In each game, players had to guess a color code of ten
positions. Each position could be colored with one of
the following colors: red, blue, or yellow. Participants
had 225 seconds to guess the code after initial access to
a partial sequence of the code. An example as well as
the proposed codes of the neighboring players is shown
in Fig. 2 A.
At the beginning of the game, only three out of the ten
positions of the common target color code were shown
to the players. The positions shown were generated at
random covering the full code and they were randomly
FIG. 2. Interactive interface of the game. (A) Example
of the partial target code shown initially to the player dis-
playing positions 3, 5 and 10 with the correct color, while the
other positions are empty. Green boxes with question marks
are the remaining positions of the code to be guessed by the
player (green color is not used in the color code sequence).
(B) Interface for the first guess. When the mouse cursor is
placed over a question mark green box, a list of available
colors present in the code is shown. (C) Player interface dur-
ing the game. At the top of the screen the proposals from
neighboring players (Team) are shown. When a member of
the Team updates her code, a flashing ’new code’ bubble is
shown on the icon of the updater.
assigned to the players. After seeing the initial partial
code, the players faced an empty code (green boxes with
question marks) that they had to fill with their propos-
als. When the cursor was placed over one of the posi-
tions, a list of available colors was displayed on top of it
(see Fig. 2 B). To avoid any bias towards any particular
color, the order of the list of available colors presented
to each player was randomly generated. When a player
choses one of the colors in the list, the position is colored
accordingly. Once the player fillS the entire color code,
the update button is activated to submit and share the
proposed color code. The player could then see the pro-
posals of the neighbors only after the completion of the
first guess.
Each player was initially randomly assigned to a node
in the network and was limited to share her proposals
only with the neighbors. Consequently, players only saw
the proposals of their neighbors. Fig. 2 C shows the game
interface after the first proposal of the focal player now
3including the proposals of the neighbors. The visualiza-
tion interface limits the size of the neighborhood, and, to
simplify the analysis, we considered networks where each
node had the same number of neighbors. In particular we
used a regular lattice and a degree regular random net-
work as they show differentiated topological properties,
for instance, with respect to the average path length. In
order to avoid the effect of learning, if any, the topolog-
ical arrangement of the networks in Experiment 1 was
random, regular, regular, and random, while in Experi-
ment 2 it was permuted to regular, random, random, and
regular. In all network configurations, the node degree
was set to k = 4.
At the end of each game, the players were rewarded with
10 points for finishing the game, and 100 points per cor-
rect position. A bonus of 1000 points was granted to
the players guessing the correct code. Before starting a
new game, a ranking of the players was shown. This was
shown as an incentive to the players although but it was
not used in the analysis.
RESULTS
The activity during the game is measured by the num-
ber of complete color codes submitted by the players.
Fig. 3 shows how the activity of the players during the
games fluctuates around an average activity of 10 pro-
posals every 5 seconds. The complementary cumulative
distribution of inter-proposal time, that is, the time be-
tween two consecutive proposals for the same individual,
reveals an exponential decay of the individuals activity
with a characteristic time of 28 ± 3 s after Maximum
Likelihood Estimation (MLE) [28].
In all the games, as the time increases, the participants
tend toward the proposed color code. The hamming dis-
tance, defined as the number of differing positions be-
tween two color codes, averaged over all pairs of players
at the end of each game lies in the range (2.1, 3.3). The
performance of the collective is measured by the tem-
poral evolution of the accuracy averaged over the total
number of players, that is, p(t) = 1N
∑
j
∑
i δxj(li,t),c(i),
where δa,b is the Kroneckers delta. Fig. 4A shows p(t) as
well as the individual distributions for the two networks
considered in the experiment. The average performance
of the group at the end of the games with the same inter-
action network is p = 8.3. The unpaired Mann-Whitney
U test and the paired Wilcoxon signed rank test, com-
puted for the distributions of p(t) values at each time
step of 1 s indicate the absence of any statistical differ-
ence between the distributions of p(t) in the two networks
(average p-values > 0.4, see Fig. S1).
The propagation of information is investigated by mea-
suring the relationship between the probability of pro-
viding a correct answer and the distance to the closest
source. For a position, a node is a source if the position
corresponds to one of the entries provided initially to the
player in that node. The positions shown initially are
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FIG. 3. Activity of the players during the games.
Main figure: complementary cumulative distribution func-
tion (ccdf) of the inter-proposal times (bin size: 1 s). Dashed
line shows an exponential fit (MLE) to the data f(t) =
exp(−bt) with b = 0.036 s−1. Inset: Temporal distribution of
the number of proposals across the games aggregated in bins
of 5 s. Dotted line shows the averaged activity of 10 proposals
every 5 seconds.
correctly assigned 95% of the times by the players and
practically remain unchanged during the game, with only
26 changes for these positions out of the 1491 proposals.
For each player and each unknown position li, we com-
pute the shortest distance to the closest source and the
number of correct answers at a given distance di. For
the two topologies and the experimental conditions, any
player and any unknown position is at maximum distance
of two to the closest source. The ratio between the proba-
bilities of correct answers given at distance 1 and 2 from
the sources indicates that proximity to source provides
an advantage (24.4% on the average) to get the correct
color (Fig. 4B).
The adaptation of the players across the first and the
last game in each experimental session is quantified by
the averaged inter-proposal time. We observe similar val-
ues for the two experiments, and although the average
values are similar, the last automata game shows sys-
tematically a smaller average inter-proposal time (Fig.
S2).
Transition events and probabilities
Given the sequence of proposals of one player and the
color codes of the neighbors, we calculate the transition
probabilities between different colors. We consider that
each position is independent of each other, thus, we aver-
age the transition probabilities over all positions. From
all the possible transitions between colors, we compute
the conditional probability to change from any color to a
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FIG. 4. Group performance: temporal evolution of the
accuracy. (A) Average number of correct positions for ag-
gregated data of the games with the same interaction topology
(solid thick lines, red random networks; blue: regular lattice).
The number of correct positions of the individual players is
also shown (dimmed symbols). For visualization purposes a
slight vertical displacement has been applied. (B) Ratio be-
tween the probabilities of correct positions at distances d1 = 1
and d2 = 2 from the closest source. Inset: Temporal evolu-
tion of the fraction of correct positions for distances d1 and d2
to the closest source. In both panels, results are aggregated
over all the sessions of the experiments.
given color X, P (X|nX) given nX neighbors in state X.
This probability, shown in Fig. 5A, indicates that colors
are practically equivalent for the players. This probabil-
ity also points that, for a given position, as the number
of neighbors with the same color nX increases, the higher
the probability that the player will switch to that color
(or remain on it).
In addition, the probability to change to a different
color P (X|X,nX) and the probability to remain in the
same color P (X|X,nX) measure the influence of the
neighborhood to either transitions between colors XX
or to remain in the same color (transitions XX). As
Fig. 5B shows, both the probability to change to color
Xf and the probability to stick with color Xf increase
with the number of neighbors nXf having color Xf . The
neighborhood provides stronger confirmation of the cur-
rent state of the individual than exerts pressure to change
it. This is, given a neighborhood configuration with nXf ,
the probability for a player to stay in her current state
(being Xf ) is greater than the probability of changing her
state (being not Xf ) to Xf . Interestingly, the conviction
of a player in her current state can be quantified by the
value of P (X|X, 0) ≈ 0.4, which matches P (X|X,n∗)
for n∗ = 3, corresponding to the neighborhood majority
since the degree of the interaction networks was set to
k = 4.
Bayesian update
We assume players update their beliefs based on their
previous belief and the information observed from the
neighborhood. Then, following Bayes theorem, the pos-
terior belief of agent i in state X = R,B, Y conditioned
to receiving a signal A = R,B, Y is updated as follows,
Ppost(X|A) = P (A|X)Ppre(X|A)∑
xi=R,B,Y
P (A|xi)Ppre(xi|A) . (1)
By iterating Eq. (1), the posterior belief of player i
after receiving nR red, nB blue, and nY yellow signals is
Ppost(X|A) = P (R|X)
nRP (B|X)nBP (Y |X)nY Ppre(X|A)∑
xi=R,B,Y
P (R|xi)nRP (B|xi)nBP (Y |xi)nY Ppre(xi|A) . (2)
Note that
∑
Ai=R,B,Y
Ppost(X|Ai) = 1. Now, assuming
that P (A|X) = C0 for A = X and P (A|X) = C ′ for
A 6= X, Eq. (2) becomes Ppost(X|A) = 1
1 +
∑
xi 6=X
(C
′
C0
)nX−nxi Ppre(xi|A)Ppre(X|A)
. (3)
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FIG. 5. Transition Probabilities. (A) Probability
P (X|nX) to change the unknown positions of the code from
any color (R, B or Y) to a given color X (R, B or Y) as a
function of nX , this is, the number of nearest neighbors al-
ready with color X. Results for each color are represented
by the corresponding colored symbols. (B) Probabilities
P (Xf |Xi;nXf ) for the unknown positions of the code as a
function of nXf . Open and solid symbols represent, for a
given position, transitions between different colors (XX) and
between the same color (XX) respectively. Results for each
color are represented by the corresponding colored symbols.
Dashed lines represent fitting Eq. (5) to the data (see Section
Bayesian update for more details).
The first hypothesis to consider is that the previous
belief of the players, Ppre(xi|A), is not related to the
actual state of the player and it takes the same value for
the different states X. In this case, Eq. (3) reduces to
Ppost(X|A) = 1
1 +
∑
xi 6=X
snX−nxi
. (4)
with s = C ′/C0.
We can estimate the value of the parameter s from the
experimental data by computing the root-mean-square
error (RMSE) of the difference between the probabilities
extracted from the experimental data and the probabili-
ties computed using Eq. (4). The RMSE, shown in Fig.
6A, exhibits a minimum for s ≈ 12 indicating that the
probability that the signal is of the same value than the
current state is twice the probability that the signal has
a different value. This result is in agreement with the
experimental findings shown in Fig. 5B.
We contemplate a second hypothesis where Ppre(xi|A)
is not independent of the current state, so, defining a =
Ppre(xi|A)
Ppre(X|A) and s = C
′/C0, Eq. (3) can be now written as
Ppost(X|A) =

1
1+a
∑
xi 6=X
snX−nxi
, if A = X.
1
1+a−1snX−nA+
∑
xi 6=(X,A)
snX−nxi
, if A 6= X.(5)
We can now estimate the parameters a and s by mea-
suring the RMSE between the aggregated probabilities
extracted from the experimental data and the probabili-
ties computed from Eq. (5). The RMSE exhibits a mini-
mum for the parameters s = 0.57 and a = 0.19 (Fig. 6B).
The parameter a takes into account non-social informa-
tion only. For the same number of individuals choosing
among the options (i.e., nx1 = nx2 = nx3), a = 1 cor-
responds to equal weight between the options providing
a probability of 1/3, as in a random choice. a < 1 im-
plies a tendency to remain in your current state since
P (X|A =X) tends to 1 as a tends to zero, while for a > 1,
individuals tend to change their states more often. The
parameter s contains the social influence. For s = 1,
the players’ own opinion and the opinion of the neigh-
borhood are balanced, providing a probability of 1/2 (for
a = 1). However, when s < 1 the opinion of the neighbor-
hood counts more than the players’ own opinion, while
the opposite happens for s > 1.
Simulations
We have performed simulations confronting various
models with the experimental data, where agents change
their state according to the experimentally determined
transition probabilities. We have also considered other
models with different updating rules. In the Major-
ity rule, agents pick the color of the majority of their
neighborhood and ties are broken by random elections
among the tied options. In the Voter model, agents pick
a color at random from the ones present in the neigh-
borhood. In the Random model however, agents pick a
color at random not necessarily present in the neighbor-
hood. The simulations mimic the experimental condi-
tions of the games by using the same number of agents,
the same initial conditions, and the same temporal se-
quence of updates. Fig. 7 shows the time evolution of
the performance p(t) for the different models and the
experimental data, in both cases aggregated over games
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FIG. 6. Data fitting. (A) Root-mean-square error between
the probabilities computed from experimental data (aggre-
gated over all the experiments) and Eq. (4). Results for
each color are represented by the corresponding colored lines.
(B) Color-coded root-mean-square error between the proba-
bilities computed from experimental data (aggregated over all
the colors across experiments) and Eq. (5).
with the same interaction topology. In both networks,
Majority rule outperformed all other strategies, includ-
ing the one used by humans. In the random network,
Voter performs at the end of the games as well as hu-
man strategies. In the regular network, Voter performs
slightly worse than Majority, and slightly better than hu-
man strategies. For both networks, choosing a color at
random independently of the neighbors’ proposals is the
worst strategy. Simulations also corroborate that, for the
human strategy (Probabilities), there are no differences
in the performance of the different networks considered.
DISCUSSION
We developed a web-based experiment in order to as-
sess how different interaction topologies affect the perfor-
mance of the aggregation of information and to investi-
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FIG. 7. Confronting different models via simulations.
Temporal evolution of p(t) for different simulation models in
two types of interaction networks. Probabilities corresponds
to simulations using the experimentally determined probabili-
ties. Experimental data is represented by the black line and it
is aggregated over games with the same interaction topology.
Simulations are averaged over 50 independent realizations.
gate the underlying decision making process. We found
that the behavior of the individuals was well captured by
Bayes theory of probability update. Bayesian inference
has been observed in human sensorimotor learning [32]
and probabilistic cognition [33] as well as in the behavior
of many animals [34, 35] (and references therein). The
derived expression for the probabilities allows for the esti-
mation of the parameters s and a, accounting for factors
such as the external social influence and the internal pref-
erence respectively. Different functional forms for these
probabilities are reported in the literature [3, 36–38] for
different animals (including humans) and behavioral sit-
uations. The parameter fitting to different experimental
data shows a high variability in the values of s (social in-
fluence) and a (internal preference), which suggests that
they are not only idiosyncratic but also task dependent.
We found that proximity to the source provides a
significant advantage in getting the correct answer. The
propagation of information can be seen as a wave front
emanating from the different sources. The positions
shown initially are correctly assigned by the players and
almost do not change during the game. Thus, neighbors
at distance d = 1 will receive this as a constant signal
compared to positions that are not known and conse-
quently are changed more often.
With respect to the effect on the aggregation of infor-
mation of the different interaction topologies considered,
we found no significant difference on the performance
of the game. This result is in line with the behavior in
the context of cooperation. In this case, players have to
choose between two options: cooperate or defeat, and
they get a payoff according to a payoff matrix and the
response of their neighbors. Recent large experiments
show no difference in the performance at the level of
number of cooperators [20]. However, differences in
the performance depending on the network topology
are reported in other works. For example, in search
problems, efficient networks can outperform inefficient
networks [29] and the opposite has also been reported
7[30, 31]. The reason for this contradictory result is
already discussed in reference [29], pointing out that
the level of myopia during the search plays a crucial
role: in searches performed at intermediate levels, i.e.
not too close nor too far, inefficient networks can out-
perform efficient ones. It also established that humans
outperform simulated strategies, pointing out that,
for the search class of problems they have considered,
agent-based simulations are not sufficiently sophisticated
to reflect human responses [30]. In contrast, we found
that simulations using agent-based models are useful
to find a better performing strategy that solves our
problem. By confronting the experimental probabilities
with different numerical models based on different
decision rules, we found that players did not perform
optimally, showing that the Majority rule outperformed
players’ outcome for the proposed task. A fundamental
question that emerges from this result is why does
individuals use Bayesian inference despite the fact that
it is not the optimal strategy?. Our hypothesis is that
Bayesian inference explores and maintains the diversity
of options for longer time compared to the Majority
rule that quickly narrows the set of final options. A test
of this hypothesis could be done in future experiments
by decreasing the initial set of positions shown to the
players.
The adaptation is an important factor to be con-
sidered in games where participants are made to play
several times. In our experimental setup we specifically
designed the first and the last games to evaluate the
adaptation of the players while minimizing the inter-
ference with the subsequent games. Players were faster
at the end of each experimental session corresponding
to a decrease in the inter-proposal times. However,
in the games involving human players, we found no
differences in the performance of the players. Thus,
players familiarized with the game interface during
the first game, and no further advantage was obtained
from acquiring more experience in the subsequent games.
In all the sessions, the participants approached the cor-
rect color code. Whether the games lasted enough time
to let the players reach consensus is an open question
that needs to be addressed in future experiments. De-
spite the results reported here, it would be interesting
to consider larger networks. We plan to conduct more
experiments with larger groups in order to address inter-
action networks with different neighborhood sizes as well
as change the cognitive load of the game by varying the
number of positions initially shown and the length of the
code. It would also be interesting to study how people
form consensus far from the correct solution of the prob-
lem, that can be triggered by initializing incompatible
targets.
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SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Phases of the game
Each game is divided in 5 phases:
• Phase 1. The goal and instructions of the game are
displayed on the screen during 60 seconds.
• Phase 2. During 10 seconds, a different set of po-
sitions of the target color code is shown to each
player. The positions of the code not shown to the
player are displayed as question marks over green
background (see Fig. 2 A).
• Phase 3. Each player has to introduce a com-
plete color code, probably using the information
provided initially, by filling the ten question marks
of the empty color code.
• Phase 4. The player is allowed to perform as many
guesses as considered necessary within the game
timer countdown (225 s). After introducing a first
complete guess, the player is able to see the color
codes proposed by the neighbors (see Fig. 2 C).
• Phase 5. Once the timer comes to zero, the game
ends and the player is rewarded with a score ac-
cording to the number of correct colors answered.
After the individual scoring, a historical ranking of all
the players with their scores is shown. During this stage
the players are synchronized again in order to start the
next game simultaneously.
Instructions to the participants
The main goal of the game is shown at the beginning
of the experiment as the following itemized list:
• At each game a secret sequence of colors (the Secret
Code) will be provided
• Your goal is to find all the colors of the Secret Code
before the Timer (top-right) comes to zero
• The more colors you find, the higher will be your
Score
8• Obtain the highest Score to become the new Leader
At the beginning of each game, the following list of
instructions is shown to each participant:
• To begin with, we will show you part of the Secret
Code
• We also assigned you a Team (top) that knows
parts of the Secret Code
• Color Your Code (bottom) and Update it to see the
Codes of your Team
• Look at the Codes of your Team to improve Your
Code
A button with a summary of instructions is displayed
in the main screen. That summary contained the follow-
ing instructions:
• Your goal is to find all the colors of the Secret Code
before the Timer (top-right) comes to zero
• The more colors you find, the higher will be your
Score
• Color Your Code (bottom) as the code initially
shown
• You must color all the question marks of Your Code
before clicking the Update button
• Look at the Codes of your Team (top) to improve
Your Code. They contain parts of the Secret Code
Automata games
In each experimental session, the first and the last
game were played against automata. In order to min-
imize interferences with the subsequent games only two
colors per position (red or blue) were used, and five po-
sitions of the code were initially shown to the players in
these games. The first game was intended to let the play-
ers familiarize with the interface of the game. The last
game was used to evaluate the adaptation of the players.
In these games, no interconnection network was used,
each player only interacted with four automata.
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indicates the 5% significance level.
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Inter-proposal time for the automata games in
each experiment. The mean inter-proposal time for
the first (filled symbols) and last game (open symbols),
both played against automata, for each experiment.
Bars represent the standard error.
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